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In The Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between 
three kinds of friendship:  friendship of pleasure, of utility, and 
of virtue.  Of these three, he claims that friendship based on 
virtue is the truest or most complete form.  Thus, to learn what 
true friendship is in Aristotle’s view, one must first learn how he 
defined virtue, since the former is dependent on the latter.  In 
this essay I will argue that what Aristotle says about friendship 
is true, however, his ethical framework ultimately falls short of 
accounting for why this is true.  Something more is needed.  I 
will then offer a possible solution that might better explain why 
virtuous friendship is the most complete.  And finally, I will 
attempt to deal with some possible objections to this solution.
II. The Most Rational Friendship
Since Aristotle’s definition of true friendship is dependent on 
his definition of virtue, it is best to begin with a brief overview 
of what he said about virtue.  Aristotle’s ethical framework is 
an “end” based framework.  He claimed that for every action 
there is some end or goal in mind which he called the good. 
Accordingly, there is a hierarchy of ends, with most ends falling 
under the umbrella of higher master ends or higher goods.  For 
example, marksmanship can be an art in itself, but it can also 
be a means to military strategy.  In turn, military strategy is a 
means to victory; victory is a means to national security, and 
so forth.  However, Aristotle claimed that not everything can 
be a means to an end because that would require an infinite 
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regress of ends, which would make our actions meaningless 
and futile.  So, he posits the existence of an end, “which we 
desire for its own sake, an end which determines all our other 
desires” (qtd. in Johnson 2007 p.62).  This end would be the final 
end and also the Supreme Good at which all our actions and 
choices aim.  Aristotle believes the supreme good is happiness, 
but to leave it at that would be, as he puts it, “trite.”  He takes 
it further and claims the best way to define the highest good 
is to ascertain the “proper function” of humankind.  He asks:
Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and 
the shoemaker have definite functions or businesses 
belonging to them, man as such has none, and is not 
designed by nature to fulfill any function?  Must we 
not rather assume that, just as the eye, the hand, the 
foot and each of the various members of the body 
manifestly has a certain function of its own, so a human 
being also has a certain function over and above all 
the functions of his particular members?  What then 
precisely can this function be? (p.12, Book I, vii, 11)
Aristotle reasons that the proper function of humankind cannot 
be simply to exist, since that is no different from plants.  Nor can 
it be merely sensory perception or impulse because that is no 
different than animals.  He concludes that the proper function 
of humankind is the “active exercise of the rational faculty” 
(p.13, Book I, vii, 13).  Reason is what sets us apart from all 
other living things.  It is our characteristic activity.  The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines Aristotle’s position on virtue as, 
...the state that makes a human being good and makes 
him perform his function well.  His function (his ergon 
or characteristic activity), Aristotle says,…is rational 
activity, so when we perform rational activity well, we 
are good (virtuous) human beings and live well (we 
are happy).  [However] Scholars disagree about what 
kind of rational activity Aristotle means (Homiak 2003).  
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Whatever the disagreements, we can summarize Aristotle’s 
argument thus far:
1. There is a supreme good at which all our actions and 
desires aim.
2.  The proper function of humankind must be the supreme 
good.
3. The active exercise of the rational faculty is the proper 
function of humankind.
4.  Therefore, the active exercise of the rational faculty is the 
supreme good at which all our actions and desires aim.
In the Aristotelian framework, a good shoemaker is not one 
who makes a shoe every once in a while, or makes poorly 
constructed shoes that fall apart.  No, a good shoemaker is 
one who consistently makes high quality shoes.  He excels 
at his particular function.  Likewise, a good human is one 
who excels at his particular function of being a rational 
creature.  The good person is consistently exercising his 
rational faculty and actively living in accordance with rational 
principle.  This is our function according to Aristotle and 
this is the basic premise of his ethical argument.  Later, in 
The Nichomachean Ethics, he offers the Doctrine of the Mean, 
which describes in detail what the good person will look like, 
how he will act under certain circumstances, and what kind of 
relationships he will have.  That brings us to our main concern. 
Aristotle said, “The perfect form of friendship is that between 
the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue” 
(p.208, Book VIII, iii, 5).  So, let us examine what he said 
about virtuous friendships.  Aristotle criticizes friendships 
that are not based on virtue as being base or vulgar.
A friendship based on utility dissolves as soon as its 
profit ceases; for the friends did not love each other, 
but what they got out of each other.  Friendships 
therefore based on pleasure and on utility can exist 
between two bad men, [or] between one bad man and 
one good…But clearly only good men can be friends 
for what they are in themselves; since bad men do 
not take pleasure in each other, save as they get some 
advantage from each other (p.210, Book VIII, iv, 2).
Aristotle goes on to explain that a good and virtuous person 
will do good to his friend for his friend’s sake, and not 
his own.  There is a selflessness to the disposition of the 
virtuous, as opposed to the selfishness of the non-virtuous. 
And when this selfless goodwill is reciprocated between two 
individuals, it is a complete and true friendship.  If one party 
is selfish, then the relationship is not mutual and it falls short 
of a complete friendship.  Aristotle’s view corroborates our 
common experience and intuition.  It seems to make perfect 
sense—until we go back and remember that he defined the 
supreme good as the “active exercise of the rational faculty.” 
It is here where a couple of problems present themselves. 
            First, if the ultimate aim for a human is to actively exercise 
his rational faculty, then it does not require him to do it in a 
virtuous way.  He could excel at calculating how to use people. 
He could excel at being manipulative in his relationships, as 
unfortunately many people do.  He could even be rationally 
cruel; “artistically cruel” as it has been put. In other words, 
being virtuous is not a necessary condition for being rational. 
However, this may be unfair to Aristotle.  Perhaps he didn’t 
say that at all, and I’ve got it backwards.  One could argue 
that Aristotle did not say that virtue is a necessary condition 
for being rational, but instead he argued the opposite – that 
rationality is a necessary condition for behaving virtuously. 
That claim is controversial, as will be shown later, but I will 
concede it for now and respond with the following: In an end 
based framework, there is nothing beyond the final end.  If my 
above summary of Aristotle’s argument is correct, then the final 
end for Aristotle is the active exercise of the rational faculty; 
that is the supreme good.  But a sufficient condition is beyond 
the necessary condition.  If necessary condition Y is also the 
final end and supreme good, then there is nothing obligating 
us to go beyond that to the sufficient condition X.  Let me offer 
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an illustration.  Being in Kansas City, Missouri is a necessary 
condition for being on the UMKC campus.  Being at UMKC 
is sufficient for saying you are in Kansas City.  However, if 
your final destination or end goal is to merely get to Kansas 
City, then there is nothing that guarantees or obligates you 
to go beyond that into the UMKC campus.  Likewise, if active 
rationality (as the necessary condition) is the final end, then 
there is nothing that guarantees or obligates a person to go 
beyond that and behave virtuously.  But perhaps I am still being 
unfair to Aristotle by not taking into consideration his detailed 
description of the virtuous person, as outlined in the Doctrine of 
the Mean.  To that I would simply argue that the Mean does not 
follow necessarily from his premises that lay the foundation for 
the supreme good.  One could rationalize being a coward just 
as easily, maybe more easily, than being courageous.  But that is 
a whole other argument in itself.  The point I am making is that 
even though virtually everything Aristotle says about friendship 
is correct in my opinion, his ethical framework, which is an 
integral part of his argument, does not fully support it.  This 
creates problems for Aristotle when he begins to talk about 
virtuous friends being selfless and loving the other for their 
own sake.  There is nothing about rationality that compels a 
person to go beyond the end of rationality and become selfless. 
Are there not friendships in which we are dreadfully fair with 
our companions; not sacrificing one moment of unearned time, 
one bit of undeserved energy, not giving any credit where it isn’t 
due?  These kinds of friendships are common – perhaps the 
most common.  And what is unreasonable about them?  Nothing. 
They are perfectly rational and fair, yet there is no self-sacrifice. 
One can achieve the supreme good of actively exercising one’s 
rational faculty and still never be selfless, which is necessary 
to achieve complete friendship. Reason is blind and pitiless. 
There is nothing about reason itself that causes us to love. 
            The second problem for Aristotle is that the person who 
is actively rational may never achieve true intimacy.  Aristotle 
writes, “It is not possible to have many friends in the full meaning 
of the word friendship, any more than it is to be in love with 
many people at once… for perfect friendship you must get to 
know a man thoroughly, and become intimate with him, which 
is a very difficult thing to do” (p.212, Book VIII, vi, 2).  Aristotle 
correctly points out the difficulty of achieving true friendship, 
that is, intimacy.  But what Aristotle doesn’t account for is this: 
for a person to achieve true intimacy he must often do things that 
some would see as completely irrational!  He must forgive when 
his friend does not deserve it.  He must take the risk of making 
himself vulnerable.  He must have courage.  He must have faith. 
This is why it is so difficult to be truly intimate with people. 
And to compound this difficulty, for complete friendship to be 
achieved, these things must be reciprocated.  Both people must 
forgive, both must make themselves vulnerable, both must have 
courage, both must have faith.  It is truly hard to be intimate! 
Some may see Aristotle’s picture of the virtuous man as one 
who is perfectly temperate, reasonable, and moderate.  And 
while these qualities can be guards against vice and wrong-
doing, they can also be obstacles for what is required to truly 
love.  The great missionary preacher Oswald Chambers (1935) 
once wrote, “If human love does not carry a man beyond 
himself, it is not love.  If love is always discreet, always wise, 
always sensible and calculating, never carried beyond itself, 
it is not love at all.  It may be affection, it may be warmth of 
feeling, but it has not the true nature of love in it” (p.52).  And 
so it is true, real friendship requires real intimacy; real intimacy 
requires real love; and real love often requires what some see 
as irrational.  Reason can often prevent us from taking that risk.
 Now there is a disagreement as to what counts as being 
rational and this is the controversy that I spoke of earlier. 
While some see taking the risk of making oneself vulnerable 
as irrational, others may see it as perfectly rational and thus 
the claim that rationality is a necessary condition for behaving 
virtuously is confirmed for them.  For example, one may reason 
that what is lost by failing to make oneself vulnerable and open 
to intimacy, is greater than what one gains by not taking the risk. 
In other words, rationality can tell us that it is more beneficial 
in the end to take the risk of making oneself vulnerable.  But 
beneficial for whom?  For oneself.  Notice the selfish logic that is 
intrinsic to rationality.  Any attempt to show that self-sacrifice is 
somehow rational will always employ some form of self-interest, 
which seems contrary to the very idea of “self-sacrifice.”  This 
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kind of reasoning seems to go against what Aristotle said is 
characteristic of virtuous friendship, in which each party loves 
the other for their sake and not his own.  But this argument 
would involve an in-depth exploration of duty, altruism, etc. 
which would greatly exceed the length and purpose of this essay. 
My only point for bringing it up is to show that Aristotle’s claim 
that rationality is a necessary condition for behaving virtuously is 
controversial at best.  There is an entire tradition that argues that 
many virtuous acts are completely irrational.  A lot of people 
see love as an irrational endeavor.  There may indeed be good 
reasons to love, but that does not necessarily make love rational. 
Thus far, we have seen that there can be nothing beyond the 
final end.  The final end (and supreme good), for Aristotle, is 
the active exercise of the rational faculty.  Also, a sufficient 
condition is “beyond” the necessary condition.  If rationality is 
a necessary condition for behaving virtuously, and rationality 
is the final end, then one has no need to go beyond rationality 
and behave virtuously.  Furthermore, the claim that rationality 
is a necessary condition for virtuous behavior is controversial 
at best because there are many virtuous acts that could be 
argued are completely irrational.  Ultimately, Aristotle’s ethical 
framework falls short as a foundation for explaining why virtuous 
friendships are the most complete.  Something more is needed.
III. The Proper Function of Humankind
 Aristotle was correct to assert that friendships based 
on utility and pleasure are not true friendships, and it is only 
friendships based on virtue that achieve real intimacy.  But 
something more is needed to explain why this is true and fill in 
the gaps of Aristotle’s argument.  Let us go back once again to 
what Aristotle said about the supreme good.  He attempted to 
define the supreme good by ascertaining the proper function 
of humankind, which he said must be a function that is “over 
and beyond all the functions” of a human’s particular members. 
He then concluded that living in accordance with reason is the 
proper function of humankind.  But isn’t reason a function of 
one of our members – the mind?  So then reason is not over and 
beyond all of our other functions.  It is simply a function which 
distinguishes humans from the rest.  Perhaps there is a different 
function which humans are designed for.  Maybe the active 
exercise of the rational faculty is not the final end, but a means to 
something else – the true final end.  Allow me to offer one possible 
answer which is quite simple:  real friendship is based on a virtue 
where intimacy itself is the supreme good and the final end. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “intimate” as 
– “inmost, most inward, deep seated; hence, pertaining to or 
connected with the inmost nature or fundamental character 
of a thing; essential; intrinsic.”  Perhaps it is this goal - to be 
“connected with the inmost nature” of something or someone 
- that is our deepest psychological desire, as well as our “proper 
function.”  When that desire is directed at an entity with the 
capacity for the same desire (i.e. a human being), is when 
intimacy can reach its fullest and most glorious form.  Maybe 
intimacy, not rationality, is the “end which determines all our 
other desires.”  If intimacy is an end in itself, then reason is 
merely a tool to assist in achieving that end.  In turn, emotion 
would also be a tool since true intimacy cannot exist without 
it.  Therefore, a friendship in which both parties’ goal is true 
intimacy will be the most complete friendship.  When intimacy 
is the shared goal, everything else falls in line.  Both parties will 
do what is required to achieve that goal: they will forgive, and 
they will allow themselves to be forgiven; they will take risks, 
and they will allow risks to be taken on their behalf; they will be 
courageous, and they will be vulnerable; they will be rational, 
and they will have faith.  In this view, friendships based on utility 
and pleasure, while sometimes rational, can never achieve true 
intimacy because the goal of the parties involved is not intimacy, 
but something else.  Their motives are not virtuous.  It is only 
friendships where the motive of each party is virtuous – that is, 
concerned with intimacy – where they attain true friendship. 
This ethical framework, in which intimacy is the supreme 
good, may correct the deficiencies of Aristotle’s framework 
and corroborate multiple aspects of the human experience. 
First, if the ultimate aim for a human is to achieve intimacy, 
then it requires him to do it in a virtuous way; that is, it requires 
him to be selfless. Selflessness, or goodwill as some might call it, 
is a necessary condition for intimacy to occur.  Aristotle points 
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out that friendship is not an emotion, but a fixed disposition 
(p.212, Book VIII, v, 5).  It is a voluntary activity in which we 
strive for intimacy.  This requires us to have a disposition of 
general goodwill.  Aristotle remarks, “Goodwill is inoperative 
friendship, which when it continues and reaches the point 
of intimacy may become friendship proper.  Goodwill seems 
therefore to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure 
of the eye is the beginning of love” (p.240, Book IX, v, 3).  One 
cannot be truly intimate without having goodwill; just as one 
cannot have romantic love without first having some level of 
attraction.  To put it in the terms of logic, we could say, “If 
intimacy, then goodwill.”  Intimacy is sufficient for saying there 
is goodwill.  Goodwill is a necessary condition for intimacy. 
Our experience confirms this truth.  The people I know who 
have the most successfully intimate relationships, are also the 
kindest and most deep hearted people I know.  And in turn, 
the people I know that lack goodwill the most; that are the 
cruelest and meanest people I can think of, are quite definitely 
the loneliest.  Their lives are completely void of intimacy. 
They have not achieved it even with their spouse or children. 
 If intimacy is the final end at which all our actions aim, then 
rationality is a means, or guide, to get us there.  This would 
make Aristotle’s claim that rationality is a necessary condition 
for behaving virtuously more convincing.  If intimacy is the end 
goal and virtuous behavior is necessary to achieve that goal, and 
being rational is necessary for behaving virtuously, then all of 
these things are achieved as a means to intimacy.  To recall my 
earlier illustration, if the sufficient condition of getting to the 
UMKC campus is the end goal, then getting to the necessary 
condition of arriving in Kansas City is not enough.  One is 
required to keep going until one gets to UMKC.  Similarly, if 
the sufficient condition of virtuous behavior (intimacy) is the 
end goal, then merely achieving the necessary condition of 
being rational is not enough.  One is required to go beyond. 
This brings clarity to the issue of selflessness.  One can achieve 
rationality while still being selfish, but one cannot achieve 
intimacy while practicing selfishness.  Intimacy requires a 
mutual giving of oneself to the other; a kind of submission or 
surrender that cannot happen if one person is selfishly holding 
back.  In his book Humanity, Jonathon Glover writes, “The 
deeper levels of relationships are denied to people who hold 
large parts of themselves back… to give yourself means that 
part of you belongs to the person you care for” (p.24).  This is 
so true.  The problem is that we have many selfish reasons for 
holding ourselves back.  Many of them are rationalizations of 
self-defense.  We fear being hurt.  We fear being found out.  So, 
we abandon intimacy and instead seek a cheap replacement—
a perversion—something to give us the illusion of intimacy 
without any of its risks.  We make friendships with people that 
will ask us what we’re doing this weekend, but would never ask 
us if we are happy in life.  We maintain relationships with people 
we can laugh with, but would never feel comfortable crying in 
front of.  We seek companions that will throw themselves at us 
physically, but deny us emotionally.  We want friends that will 
never ask us hard questions; never tell us that we are doing 
wrong, or that we are hurting ourselves.  We keep friends that we 
know will not call us out from hiding, because they are hiding 
themselves.  Selfishness prevents intimacy.  We would do well to 
remember the words that C.S. Lewis penned in The Four Loves
To love at all is to be vulnerable.  Love anything and 
your heart will certainly be wrung and possibly broken.  
If you want to make sure of keeping it intact, you must 
give your heart to no one…Wrap it carefully around with 
hobbies and little luxuries…lock it up safe in the casket 
or coffin of your selfishness.  But in that casket – safe, dark, 
motionless, airless – it will change.  It will not be broken; it 
will become unbreakable, impenetrable, irredeemable…
The only place outside heaven where you can be 
perfectly safe from all the dangers of love is hell! (121)
I am uncertain as to whether or not Lewis would agree with my 
intimacy-based framework.  But his point is well taken.  Love 
achieves intimacy, which is connection with the innermost 
nature of someone, but selfishness achieves the opposite.  It 
separates us from the innermost nature of someone.  It fractures 
relationships.  So long as we are living selfishly and fearfully, we 
will be closed off from even the possibility of intimacy and left 
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in a state of isolation.  Rationality, as the final end, cannot save 
us from this.  But intimacy, as the final end, makes clear the path.
 The second problem of Aristotle’s is also corrected.  As 
stated earlier, the perfectly rational person may never achieve 
true intimacy because it may be true that some virtuous actions, 
including love, are in fact irrational.  But if intimacy is the final 
end and the aim of a person, then this controversy does not 
really matter.  It makes no difference whether certain virtuous 
actions are actually rational or not because the ultimate end 
is not to be rational, but to be intimate.  Of course someone 
could misinterpret this and take it to the extreme of believing 
that being rational does not matter at all and we can dive head 
first into any relationship that we want, so long as intimacy is 
our goal.  This view is completely absurd.  And unfortunately, 
there are many people that hold to it.  They seem genuine and 
charismatic on the surface, but a closer look reveals a long trail 
of destruction behind them; people they have consumed and 
hurt all in the name of passion and intimacy.  Hopefully no 
one will go away from this essay thinking I have argued for 
that.  My argument is not that rationality is completely useless 
or does not matter at all.  I have simply argued that it cannot 
be the final end.  It may very well be the case that rationality 
is a necessary condition for behaving virtuously.  I do not 
know.  But rationality cannot be the final end, because then 
there is no need to go beyond it and we end up missing out on 
all the beauty of virtue and the wonderful risk of being open 
to intimacy.  In the end, we would miss out on what I believe 
is our very purpose – the proper function of humankind. 
 Finally, I want to point out that the virtuous person, 
as I have defined it, is quite likely to achieve true intimacy. 
The first reason is because, in the framework I have outlined, 
to live virtuously means to strive for intimacy.  The virtuous 
person will do what is necessary to cultivate and maintain real 
friendships.  The only possible thing that could keep them 
from this is failing to find someone who is equally dedicated 
to striving for intimacy.  That is the risk involved in it – there 
are no guarantees.  But that brings me to the second reason: 
a virtuous person will seek equally virtuous friends.  The 
person that strives for real intimacy will not waist her time 
with those that wish to play games, to be dishonest, or to just 
“have a little fun.”  That does not mean the virtuous person 
will be closed off to everyone who falls short of this standard. 
As I explained earlier, the virtuous person must have a general 
disposition of goodwill and can have any given number of 
lesser friendships.  However, she will reserve her most intimate 
and closest friendships for those who are equally virtuous. 
IV. Answering Objections
Now that I have outlined an ethical framework in which intimacy 
is the supreme good, and have shown how this framework 
could possibly correct Aristotle’s flaws and corroborate the 
human experience, I will attempt to answer some objections 
that could be raised against it.  Someone might say: 
Your framework based on intimacy ultimately results in more 
friendships of utility because you are essentially suggesting that 
we use one another as a means to an end – the end being intimacy.
Technically this objection could hold, but practically it doesn’t 
work.  This objection attempts to portray my argument as 
trivializing humans as a means to something else.  But my 
argument does not do that.  In a strict and literal sense, yes I am 
suggesting we use each other as a means to intimacy.  However, 
the way in which I am suggesting we use each other is wholly 
different than any other kind of utilitarian framework.  There 
is a way in which someone can use an object as a means to an 
end that cheapens the value of the object – to use it as merely 
a means to an end.  And there is a way in which someone can 
use an object as a means to an end that bolsters the value of 
that object, that cultivates the health of that object, and that 
helps to fulfill the purpose of that object.  Let me offer an 
illustration.  If someone wanted to build the perfect house, it 
would involve them using wood as a means.  However, they 
would not buy the cheapest wood available.  They would not 
clumsily place the wood in position, or cut it without measuring 
first.  No, they would seek out the highest quality wood.  They 
would treat it to make it stronger and bring out the natural 
beauty of its grain.  They would use the precision of a surgeon 
when measuring and cutting and they would place the wood 
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in its position in the most careful matter – all for the end of 
building the perfect house.  Similarly, to “use” someone as a 
means to intimacy is not to cheapen them, but to exhort them. 
When the goal is intimacy, a person will seek out a friend of 
the highest character, of the utmost integrity.  They will treat 
this person in a way that makes them stronger and brings out 
their natural beauty.  And they will be mindful in caring for 
this person’s heart.  Using someone as a means to intimacy 
does not cheapen that person at all.  It helps to fulfill their 
very purpose and requires a disposition of selfless goodwill.
 Your framework is too psychological.  All this talk of 
such vague concepts of intimacy and love are too abstract.
My framework is no more psychological than Aristotle’s.  I 
basically use his entire framework, the only difference being that 
I substitute intimacy in place of reason as the proper function of 
humankind. I defined the term “intimate” as thoroughly as possible. 
Ultimately, any argument that speculates the end that “determines 
all our other desires” will be psychological to some extent. 
 How can you say that intimacy is the proper 
function of humankind? Isn’t that teleological?
Much of Aristotle’s views are teleological.  I am using 
what Aristotle said as a foundation for my argument.  If 
humankind does have a proper function, then my argument 
provides good evidence that the function of humankind 
is more likely to be intimacy, rather than rationality. 
 If intimacy is the supreme good, then wouldn’t 
breaking off a friendship be the most evil thing you could do?
This, in my opinion, is the most powerful objection to my 
argument.  To answer it, I will refer to Aristotle.  He says that in 
a case of extreme moral decline of a friend, one is justified in 
breaking off the friendship.  But as long as there is capability of 
reform, we should continue to pursue him and help him morally. 
Ultimately, says Aristotle, “if one cannot restore him, one gives 
him up” (p.237, Book IX, iii, 3).  It could be argued, in a case like 
this, that it is not the morally good person that broke off the 
friendship, but the one who became evil and selfish.  It is they 
who turned away.  The morally good friend simply let him go.
 In conclusion, intimate friendship seems to be a painfully 
organic thing.  It cannot be quantified or charted.  It does not 
fit into the peg of rationality.  It always has a way of slipping 
through and evading any of our attempts to fully understand it 
intellectually.  It is possible to use our rational faculty as a guide 
as we gain more experience in choosing friends.  It can also help 
in the challenge of achieving intimacy with those whom we did 
not choose, such as our relatives. But in the end, the endeavors 
of love, intimacy, and friendship remain a beautiful mystery.  I 
believe Aristotle had a lot of insight into relationships and much 
can be learned from his writings.  He was correct that virtue is a 
form of activity – an art.  Perhaps, for most of us, the gaps between 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for friendship lie not 
in our knowledge, but in the application of that knowledge.
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 In mathematics we use square numbers often.  In 
elementary school we memorize the squares of the natural 
numbers 1 through 10, and later use them to find the radius of 
a circle whose area is 9π, or to figure out that √75 = √25.3 = 5√3√. 
So we become fairly comfortable with square numbers.  We 
may even have seen that they can be drawn as actual squares. 
 
 
 
 Square numbers, however, are not the only numbers 
that form geometric shapes.  Numbers can also be triangular, 
pentagonal, or hexagonal, etc.  These numbers that can be 
represented in geometric form, or polygonal numbers, have 
interested people for millennia, being traced back to the 
time of Pythagoras and the Pythagorean school (c. 572 - 497 
B.C.)  (Heath 1921, vol.I, p.67).  It’s easy to see how people 
who probably represented numbers in a strictly visual way, 
as quantities of pebbles in the sand, or dots arranged in a 
geometric pattern, could classify numbers as triangular, square, 
or pentagonal, etc., according to the shapes that were created 
by the arrangement of the objects (Burton 2003, p.90; Heath 
1921, vol.I, p.76).  For example, if we visualize the numbers 
3, 5, 10, and 12, we see that the numbers 3 and 10 can be 
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